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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 329 
Accident time: 15:45 Accident Date: 24/09/2000 
Where it occurred: Nr Macedonia border Country: Kosovo 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Detection accident 
(survey) 
Date of main report: 02/10/2000 
ID original source: MD/KC/JF Name of source: KMACC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMA-1 AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
Date record created: 20/02/2004 Date  last modified: 21/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 3 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR DM 796 473 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate communications (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
 
1 
Accident report 
The following is the MACC accident report, edited for anonymity. Excess pictures have also 
been removed. 
 
Introduction 
1. In accordance with the Mine Action Co-ordination Centre (MACC) Standard Working 
Procedure #4, the MACC Programme Manager issued a Convening Order on Monday 25th 
September 2000, for an accident investigation Board of Inquiry (a copy of the Convening 
Order is attached at Annex A).  
2. This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry on the mine accident that occurred 
on the 24th September 2000. Based on the investigation, the statements from [Demining 
group] personnel involved in the accident (see Annex B), visits to the accident site on the 26th 
September and the photos from the accident site, this accident is considered as a preventable 
mine accident.  
3. The information provided by [the Demining group] to the MACC Headquarters in the 
“Accident Report” attached as Annex C, is confirmed. The accident occurred on Sunday at 
approximately 15h45 on September 24th 2000 in a suspected VJ (Vojska Jugoslavije) 
minefield located near the border with Macedonia GR DM 796 473. A reconnaissance party 
led by [the Victim - Operations Manager] accompanied by [Demining group Team Leader] and 
[Demining group Assistant team Leader] were conducting a reconnaissance for a new 
Helicopter Landing Site (HLS), camping ground and future minefield for the coming week.  
4. After finding and marking the first minefield, they went on to a second site. When they 
found empty bodies of PMA-1 mines they started surveying to identify the minefield boundary. 
Working in accordance with the appropriate safety distances, they were individually sweeping 
around the suspected area. They were expecting to find the same minefield layout pattern of 
mines as the previous task site in the area.  
 
The picture above shows the accident area and the improvised marking system in use. 
5. [The Victim] found a row of PMA-1 mines and decided to follow the row and neutralize 
mines (6 - 7 PMA-1). As he was following the row he stepped with the outside front part of his 
right foot on two PMA-1 mines on top of each other. He suffered serious blast trauma to his 
right foot and leg, resulting in an amputation of the leg above the knee. There were no other 
personnel injured in the accident. The blast from the two mines (a total of 400g of explosive) 
was so powerful that it damaged the control box of the metal detector that he was carrying in 
his right hand.   
6. [The Victim] is [Demining group] Operations Manager in Kosovo. He has approximately 8 
years experience with the South African Defence Force. He has been employed by [Demining 
group] since March 1998 and was a Team Leader with one of [Demining group] teams during 
their mine/UXO clearance operation in Kosovo last year. He is considered by [Demining 
group] management to be an experienced leader and a good asset. 
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7. The accident could have happened in either of two VJ minefields, VJ# 3342 or VJ# 3343. 
This has not yet been confirmed as the actual minefield location is situated between the 
recorded location of these two minefields. In both cases, the pattern in which the mines have 
been laid is the same (see map and VJ records at annex D). The identification of the exact 
minefield cannot be determined until clearance operations are completed in the area, and this 
is not likely to occur in this clearance season. However, this will not have a major impact on 
this investigation.  
 
Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking 
8. The task dossiers for the two different minefields were given to [Demining group] by the 
MACC Operations on two separate dates. The task dossier for VJ record #3342 was given on 
2 September 2000 and the task dossier for VJ record #3343 was given on the 23 September 
2000. All minefields in the area were identified by [Demining group] to have the same layout. 
The mines found in the minefield were mainly anti-personnel blast and fragmentation mines 
PMA-1, PMR-2A and anti-tank mines TMA-5 (see map and VJ records at annex D). 
 
Geography and Weather 
9. The task site is located in an open mountainous area with compacted soil and very small 
bush and grass vegetation. The access to the site is very difficult and can only be reached by 
foot and with help of horses for resupply from the base camp in Brod village (1.5 to 2 hours). 
This stresses the importance for an HLS on site or near the site. The problem with any HLS 
site in the area is that the weather can change very quickly and any low cloud makes it 
impossible for the helicopter to land in case of an accident.  
                   
Site Layout and Marking 
10.  The only marking left from the VJ occupation was a VJ mine sign and cases of PMA-1 
that were probably neutralized by local population. The sign was standing up on the day of 
the accident and was one of the first indications of the presence of mines in the area. 
 
 
Pictures above show some of the PMA-1s previously separated by the Victim, and the VJ 
mined-area sign. 
Management Supervision and Discipline 
[Demining group] supervision is achieved by an International staff as the Team Leader and 
Assistant Team Leader. Every member of the reconnaissance team was a supervisor and 
had experience and knew what to do to comply with the [Demining group] SOPs. 
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Quality assurance and Quality Control 
12. [Demining group] internal Quality Control and Quality Assurance is attained through a 
system of adherence to [Demining group] SOPs and on-site supervision of mine/UXO 
clearance operations by qualified and experienced International Team Leader and Assistant 
Team Leader. 
13. External Quality Assurance is conducted by the MACC QA visits. No QA visit had yet 
been conducted at the site where the accident happened. 
 
Communications and Reporting 
14. In accordance with [Demining group] SOP and the MACC Guidelines and Standards, no 
clearance operations are to be performed without effective communications. On the day of the 
accident the radio communications were not very reliable. The 1200 hr scheduled radio check 
from the camping ground to the [Demining group] Base Camp in Brod didn’t work (see deputy 
Project Manager statement). The main reason for the problem was the mountainous ground 
and the bad weather, especially the low ceiling. However, the MACC Operations Officer had 
provided a radio set on Saturday the 23rd September to be used for the series of tasks in the 
accident area. The hand held radios were working for the short distances between the survey 
team and the camping ground. 
 
Medical Details 
15. Two [Demining group] Paramedic’s provided medical coverage to the survey team from 
the camping ground. At approximately 1545 hr, after hearing an explosion, [Medic 1] got on 
the radio (radio communication was not very good) and found out that [the Victim] just had an 
accident. He was equipped with a medical trauma pack, medical stretcher. After loading 
everything on a horse he went to the accident site. It took approximately 25 minutes before he 
reached the accident site where, with the help of the other paramedic he started to provide 
adequate medical treatment to the casualty. After a detailed examination of the leg injuries, 
the medic decided to evacuate the casualty to the Base Camp in Brod village on a stretcher 
mounted on the horse. The decision was made because the CASEVAC helicopter could not 
land due to the low clouds. During the evacuation that took over 3 hours, [the Victim] was 
conscious and in pain the entire time. The total time of the evacuation to the German KFOR 
field hospital took approximately five hours.  
 
Personnel 
16.  A list of all personnel and their duties is attached at Annex B. Written statements from 
[Demining group] personnel involved in the accident are attached to Annex B as appendices.  
 
Dress and Personal Protective Equipment  
17. At the time of the accident, [the Victim] was not wearing the Personnel Protective 
Equipment (PPE) in accordance with the [Demining group] SOPs. [Photographs in the file 
show that the normal PPE is a full-face visor and frontal apron with thigh straps. 
 
Tools and Equipment  
18. [The Victim] was sweeping with the standard [Demining group] metal detector (MIL-D1) at 
the time of the accident. The detector was working well since it had indicated the 6 to 7 PMA-
1 mines that he had neutralized before the accident occurred. The MIL-D1 detector was 
seriously damaged by the blast.  
The blast broke the connection of the control box and the cover of the batteries case. 
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Details of Mine Involved and evidence of Minefield 
19. The mines were 2 PMA-1 anti-personnel blast mine on top of each other. See the pictures 
[above] of the PMA-1 blast mines that were neutralized by [the Victim]. The technical 
information on the PMA-1 is provided at Annex F. 
 
Account of Activities 
18.  The following is the description of the events that led up to the accident. The statements 
that were used as a basis to describe the events are attached in Annex B: 
• At approximately 08h00 on the 24th September, [name excised] and [the Victim] had 
a radio conversation. Requirements for resupply were discussed and agreement was 
made for the next radio check at 12h00 the same day. 
• At approximately 11h00, the local deminers arrived at the Base Camp near the village 
of Brod. They informed [name excised 2, no job description given] that the bad 
weather was persisting on top of the mountains and any further work was not 
possible. [Name excised 2] decided to send the deminers’ home for two days.  
• At 12h00  [Name excised 2] was not able to establish radio contact with [name 
excused] or any other member of the team at the camping ground. 
• At approximately 12h25, [the Victim], [Team Leader] and the [Demining group 
Assistant team Leader] left the camping ground to conduct a reconnaissance to find a 
new camping ground, a new HLS and survey a few minefields for the coming week.  
• After identifying a new camping ground, the reconnaissance team circled the area to 
determine the proximity of the closest minefield. They marked the four corners and 
moved on to find a new HLS and minefield. 
• After finding pieces of PMA-1, scattered around a suspected area, they started 
searching for the boundaries of the minefield using only the metal detector.  
• The [Team Leader] went ahead and swept the small path, [Demining group Assistant 
team Leader] went left to investigate and found the row of anti-tank mines (TMA-5). 
[The Victim] was approximately 30 meters behind the [Team Leader] sweeping to find 
the row of PMA-1 mines. 
• At approximately 15h45, after finding and neutralising the first two PMA-1 mines on 
top of each other, he decided to follow the row and neutralized 6 or 7 of them. As he 
was going down the row to mark the end of the row, he stood on two PMA-1 mines on 
top of each other. 
• He rolled downhill and stopped in the path that had been cleared by the [Team 
Leader] a few minutes before. The [Team Leader] reached him first and provided first 
aid. He applied pressure on the right foot and called for [Demining group Assistant 
team Leader] who was already on his way. 
• Radio communication was established with the camping ground and request for 
medical assistance was sent to the accident site. 
• [Name excised 3 – a new name not apparently present at the accident site] informed 
[Name excised 2] of the accident during the 16h00 radio check. [Name excised 2]  
started to organize the CASEVAC from his end. He contacted the MACC senior 
partner in MNB (South) for helicopter support.  
• Approximately 25 minutes later the two [Demining group] paramedics arrived at the 
accident site and took care of the casualty.  
• After a detailed examination of the leg injuries, the paramedics decided to evacuate 
the casualty to the Base Camp, in Brod village on a stretcher mounted on a horse. 
The decision was made because the helicopter CASEVAC could not land due to the 
low clouds. During the evacuation that took over 3 hours [the Victim] was conscious 
and in pain the entire time.  
• German KFOR helicopter arrived at approximately 18h00 but because of low cloud 
was not able to locate the evacuation party on the mountain slope. They landed near 
the [Demining group] Base Camp and waited as long as they could before darkness. 
The German KFOR doctor was left behind and linked up with the German KFOR that 
had been dispatched to the [Demining group] Base Camp. 
• At approximately 19h00, the casualty arrived at Brod village. [A medic] briefed the 
KFOR German doctor about the treatment he provided to [the Victim].  
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• At 19h15 the KFOR German military ambulance left for the KFOR German field 
hospital in Prizren. 
 
Insurance Details 
19. [The Victim] was covered by the standard [Demining group] insurance for all personnel 
involved in mine/UXO clearance activities. A copy of the H.M.T. Insurance Brokers Ltd policy 
is at Annex G.  
 
Conclusions 
20. Based on this investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the BOI came to the 
following conclusions: 
• At the time of the accident, the [Demining group] reconnaissance team was 
conducting a Level 2 Survey without proper communication, medical support and 
without wearing PPE. This activity was being carried out despite an earlier decision to 
suspend clearance operations because of poor weather conditions. 
• Because it took approximately 25 minutes for the [Demining group] paramedic to 
reach the accident site, the medical support during the recce/survey was not in 
accordance with [Demining group] SOPs and the MACC Guidelines and Standards. 
According to [Demining group] SOP No.7 “every mine/UXO clearance and EOD 
activity will have adequate medical cover. The MACC Guidelines and Standards 
stipulate in chapter 7, paragraph 7.2 (a) that a trained medical assistant with all his 
equipment will be sited within 5 minutes of each mine clearing or marking team.  
• The medical treatment provided to the casualty was exceptional under the very 
difficult conditions. 
• The access to the site is very difficult and can only be done by foot and with help of 
horses for resupply from the base camp in Brod village (1.5 to 2 hours). This stresses 
the importance and need for an unconditional HLS on site or near the site.  
• The living conditions at the satellite camping ground are not acceptable. The reasons 
being that [Demining group] do not have the proper equipment to camp in the current 
weather conditions and resupply is very difficult. 
• The medical support from KFOR was very good considering the circumstances. 
• [The Victim] took an unnecessary risk by neutralising mines. Their task was to identify 
the boundaries of the minefield and mark them for future work. As mentioned in the 
Project Manager’s statement the VJ minefield records in the area are several hundred 
meters off from where they should be according to the map. This was not taken in 
consideration and should have dictated to the team to be more cautious and to work 
in a safer manner. 
• This accident was preventable. 
 
Recommendations 
21. The following are recommendations based on the Board of Inquiry conclusions: 
• It is recommended that [Demining group] manual clearance operation be suspended 
until safety limitations at the accident site are resolved. If the [Demining group] cannot 
resolve those safety issues, the MACC Operations should give them another task and 
suspend this task until next summer. The following are the minimum actions that 
[Demining group] Management have to take before re-deploying in the area of the 
accident: 
• Conduct clearance only when the weather allows it. If [Demining group] decides to set 
up a secondary HLS on the lower ground to avoid cloud concentration, this HLS will 
have to be approved by KFOR and the time to evacuate a casualty to this secondary 
HLS should be taken in consideration (no more than 1 hour). 
• Set up the proper communications system in accordance with the MACC Guidelines 
and Standards (Chapter 12 para 12.5).  
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• [Demining group] will have to provide proper living conditions and clothing for their 
staff living and working from their satellite camping ground.  
• [Demining group] Management must make sure that they work in accordance with 
their approved SOPs. Calling the work that was conducted on the day of the accident 
“recce”, does not change the fact that they were conducting a Level 2 Survey.  
• Addition safety measures must be taken when the VJ records in the area of work are 
off by several hundred meters. 
• [Demining group] must provide proper psychological support to the staff involved in 
the accident.  
Signed : QA Officer 
 
Annexes: 
A:  MACC convening order for accident investigation Board of Inquiry 
B: IMSMA Mine/UXO Accident Report  
C: Statements  
D:  Dangerous Area Report and VJ Record  
E: MACC QA Medical Officer report 
F: Technical data on the PMA-1 anti-personnel blast mine. 
G: Copy of the [Demining group] Insurance Policy.    
 
Comments by the Chief Operations Officer 
I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Board of Inquiry. 
Signed: Chief Operations Officer 
 
Comments by the Programme Manager 
The conclusions and recommendations of the BOI are concurred with. 
This accident was caused by poor judgement and decision making on the part of [the Victim] 
and cannot be considered as anything but avoidable. Whilst there are some extenuating 
circumstances surrounding the difficulty of the location, this does not provide an excuse for 
the events that took place immediately prior to the accident occurring. There were no tangible 
benefits to be attained from clearing the rows of mines once the minefield had been located. 
These could have been systematically cleared by the demining personnel at a future time. 
[The Victim] chose to conduct operations in such a way that he and other members of the 
survey team were placed in unnecessary risk. There were a number of deviations from 
approved SOP that, if followed correctly, would have prevented this accident from occurring. 
However, it is noted that whilst he was not wearing his PPE at the time of the accident, this 
would not have provided protection against the blast injuries sustained to his leg. [The Victim] 
is fortunate in that he did not receive serious secondary injuries to other parts of his body.  
It is acknowledged that [the Victim] may have felt some pressure to achieve a high rate of 
productivity and to clear as many of the minefields in this area prior to winter setting in. 
However, the need for safety is paramount and organisations are expected to make decisions 
regarding their ability to undertake operations. In this instance, the decisions made by [the 
Victim] were not appropriate.  
On the positive side, the medics that provided treatment to [the Victim] are to be 
congratulated for the way in which they handled this difficult situation. There is no doubt that 
they contributed to saving [the Victim]’s life. 
Signed: Programme Manager 
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 413 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available 
(insurance) 
Time to hospital: 5 hours 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Hand 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Above knee 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
 
Introduction 
This report is based on statements and interviews with a Paramedic, the KFOR Doctor and 
my own experiences after a visit of the accident site. 
 
Summary 
At the time of the accident there where no Medics and no medical equipment at the site. 
The two [Demining group] Paramedics were at a temporary camp approx. 30 min walking 
distance from the minefield. 
At 15:45 they heard a detonation and in the next minute they got a radio call informing them 
that [the Victim] had hit a mine was badly injured. 
The Paramedics packed all medical equipment and a stretcher at the back of a horse and 
went off in the direction of the detonation.  
After approx. 25 minutes they reached the site. 
When the Paramedics got to the casualty he was lying in the minefield 
There was a cleared path to the casualty and the area around the casualty had been cleared.  
His right foot and leg where badly injured and bleeding and his right hand had minor wounds. 
He was in great pain but he was conscious. [The Team Leader] applied pressure on the leg to 
stop the bleeding. 
The Paramedics did an examination of the injuries and compressed the artery to the leg while 
waiting for the medical equipment to arrive.  
After approx. 5 minutes the horse arrived with the stretcher and all the medical equipment. 
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The Paramedics starts to stabilise the casualty and he is placed on the stretcher  
He gets two intravenous cannulas and he gets analgesics and fluid intravenous. His right leg 
was immobilised and bandaged and his right hand was bandaged. 
He was then carried on the stretcher to a safe area where the stretcher was placed on the 
back of the horse.  
With the help of two locals they transported the casualty to the temporary [Demining group] 
camp to wait for the helicopter. 
A KFOR helicopter had been sent to the location even though it was not an approved HLS.  
Due to the weather conditions at the mountain the helicopter could not reach any area close 
to the camp but it landed in the village Brod approx. 1-hour downhill walking distance from the 
camp.  
One civilian Ambulance and one KFOR Ambulance were also sent to Brod. 
When the Paramedics knew they would not get helicopter support at their location they 
decided to walk down the mountain with the casualty.  
With the help of four locals to hold the stretcher and the horse, the Paramedics walked for 
almost two hours downhill from the mountain with a seriously injured person on a stretcher at 
the back of a horse. 
The casualty was in pain but conscious all the time he got more analgesic and more fluid 
intravenous during the transportation.  
Due to the uncomfortable transport the bleeding increases and his bandages had to be 
reinforced several times. In addition because of the cold weather and the loss of blood the 
casualty got very cold and his blood pressure drops.  
During the whole transportation the sight was minimal due to the mist. 
Before darkness the helicopter had to leave Brod and return to the base, but the KFOR 
Medical crew stayed on ground to wait for the casualty.  
When the casualty arrived at Brod he was transferred to a civilian Ambulance and transported 
through the village to the KFOR Ambulance. (KFOR APC Ambulance couldn’t enter the 
village because of narrow streets). 
At 19:15 the Paramedics gives a report to the KFOR Doctor and the casualty is taken care of 
and transported by road to the German KFOR hospital in Prizren where they arrives at 
approx. 20:45. 
The Paramedics were not allowed to go with the casualty in the KFOR Ambulance. They got 
to the hospital at 22:00 but the casualty was then in the operating theatre. 
Because of the bad injuries [the Victim]’s right leg was amputated above the knee. 
 
Conclusions 
The Paramedics did an exceptionally good job under very trying conditions. 
The medical support from KFOR was very good considering the circumstances. 
There was no approved HLS at the site. 
There were no communications with KFOR at the site. 
CASEVAC by helicopter was not possible due to the weather conditions at the site. 
Time from accident till casualty gets to KFOR hospital is 5 hours. 
 
Recommendations 
Get an approved HLS close to the site. 
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Ensure that communication lines are always functional with KFOR. 
Before starting any clearance activities, ensure you can get CASEVAC by helicopter if 
needed. 
Cancel all clearance activities when CASEVAC by helicopter is not possible due to the 
weather conditions at the site. 
The objective must always be to get the casualty to the hospital within 1 hour. 
Signed: QA Medical Officer 
  
In December 2001 the MACC reported that the Victim had been fitted with a permanent 
prosthesis and was then living and working in South Africa. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because 
the Victim was member of the management team and was in breach of several basic safety 
SOPs. His own insistence that he did not intend to clear mines when he left camp (see 
Related papers) is a bizarre excuse. His age is not recorded but he was a young ex-pat. 
The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training” because it seems that the Program 
Manager was unaware of the basic safety rules that they were in breach of. 
That the demining group chose to operate in an area without adequate medical or other 
support is a further management failing.  
As with most reports from the Kosovo MACC, the accident report demonstrates an unusually 
thorough and critical approach to accident investigation. The Mine Action Co-ordination 
Centre that carried out the investigation was not engaged in demining, and this may (in part) 
explain the unusually objective nature of their investigations 
 
Related papers 
First are the annexes made available with the MACC accident report, edited for anonymity.  
They are followed by a list of questions asked of the demining group by the investigating team 
– and their responses.  
Finally, a “REPORT ON QA COMPLETION REPORTS” for the demining group in the area of 
this accident is included to illustrate their “professionalism”. 
 
ANNEX A: MACC convening order for accident investigation Board of Inquiry 
ANNEX B: IMSMA Mine/UXO Accident Report – not included in digitised form.  
ANNEX C: Statements – see separate Statements file. 
ANNEX D: Dangerous Area Report and VJ Record – not in file. 
ANNEX E:  MACC QA Medical Officer report – see Victims tab and click on Medical report 
button. 
ANNEX F: Technical data on the PMA-1 anti-personnel blast mine – omitted for brevity. 
ANNEX G: Copy of the [Demining group] Insurance Policy – omitted for anonymity – 
Continental scale compensation. 
 
 
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION Questions 
MACC QA OFFICER QUESTIONS Dated 30 September 2000 
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1. For PM; Did you authorize the teams to work on Sunday?  
Answer; The teams were authorized to work on Sunday to conduct necessary recce’s in order 
to have work ready for the mine clearance teams. This decision was taken jointly by the PM , 
DPM , and the OPS Manager 
2. For the PM; If yes did you coordinate this with the MACC Operations Office?  
Answer; The PM and the DPM had spoken with MACC OPS and the MACC Program 
Manager reference our intentions to move up to the mountains for the duration of the task 
dossiers; that we would stay there because of the logistics and work straight through until the 
tasks were completed. Because of the helicopter support and the general minimized Sunday 
support being reduced, it was not intended to do tasks other than recce’s for camp 
movement, water sources, HLS’s etc on Sunday’s. 
3. Questions for the Operations Manager; Who gave you authorization to work on a Sunday? 
Answer; Due to the nature of the tasks and the physical location, it was a company decision 
to maximize our time and conduct recce’s on Sunday. 
4. Question; You mentioned in your statement that you were conducting a recce to find a new 
field camp, a new HLS and a couple of minefields. I conclude that according to your 
accredited SOP’s, you were conducting a level 2 survey?  
Answer; In order to safely locate a field camp, HLS and find a water supply, it is necessary to 
ensure that they are not within a dangerous area of a minefield. In trying to determine to find 
out where everything is in relation to each other the mined areas need to be identified and 
located. I did not intend to go out and find a minefield to clear. 
5. Question; Why didn’t you bring the medic with you?  
Answer ; I was planning a recce only and I didn’t think that I needed a medic for a recce. 
6. Question; Did you or any of your team members wear your PPE?  
Answer; We were not wearing PPE. 
7. Question; If not why not?  
Answer ; As I have said, it was planned  to be a recce only, PPE would not have made any 
difference what so ever to the extent of my injury because stepping a mine with or without 
PPE would not have lessened my injury. Injury from a frontal blast from a fragmentation mine 
would be lessened but not stepping on a mine. 
8. Question; Did you have any information on the minefield in the area (VJ records)? 
I had no VJ records, but I had copies of the VJ battle maps from S5- 11 and S5 12 dossiers. 
9. Question; Why did you decide to lift and neutralize the PMA – 1 mines?  
Answer ; As I have said, I did not intend to clear any mines that day. Once I found the 
minefield, I realized that it was out of location from where it should be. I wanted to determine if 
it was a similar pattern and size as the previous minefields in our area. At that point I 
unintentionally disregarded the Sunday policy. 
I hope that this answers your questions. If there are any more concerns or questions please 
let me know. 
Signed: Project manager 
 
REPORT ON QA COMPLETION REPORTS 
DONE FOR [Demining group] IN THE BROD AREA 
On 25 October 2000 it was arranged to carry out a series of completion evaluations in the 
area of Brod by my QA Inspector and myself. This arrangement included a helicopter from 
KFOR to transport us with [Demining group manager] and a medic to the site so that these 
outstanding tasks could be carried out as quickly as possible. One of these sites had also 
been the scene of the accident to [Victim name] the previous month. The completions could 
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not be accepted, as there were no pickets in the ground as required by the UN MACC 
Standards. There were also, in a number of cases not even Reference points. The [Demining 
group manager]’s attitude to this blatant refusal to adhere to the MACC Standards was that if 
the MACC wanted metal pickets in the ground then the MACC could do it itself. We had 
to walk down from the site after the evaluations, as the helicopter could not stay for the 
duration of the evaluations. I reported these events to my Project Manager and to the QA 
Officer of the MACC.    
On 27 October it was agreed to again go up the mountain on 30 October, by horse, and the 
[Demining group manager] would personally hammer metal pickets in at the turning points 
and at the reference point positions. It was also agreed that my QA Inspector would 
accompany the [Demining group manager] so that the QA evaluations could be completed.  
On Monday 30 October I took my QA Inspector to the [Demining group] offices at 0700. 
Before they left I asked the [Demining group manager] who would be the medic for the trip, as 
I did not see any of the usual [demining group] medics in the office. I was introduced to a 
young man who said that he was the medic for the trip. I accepted his word and they left.  
When they came down my QA Inspector reported to me that he had completed all the 
completion evaluations. He also reported that he had fallen off his horse at some point while 
up on the mountain and that when he stood up he saw a PMA -1 anti personnel mine on the 
ground. He told the [Demining group manager] that they were in a minefield and pointed out 
the mine to the [Demining group manager]. The [Demining group manager] said that they 
must move slowly out of the area and once out my QA Inspector realized that his wristwatch 
had come off when he fell. The owner of the horses wanted to go back to retrieve it but my 
QA Inspector stopped him. They came off the mountain about 1800 that evening. 
I found out on 2 November that the man introduced to me as the medic on 30 October is in 
reality the [Demining group manager]’s son and that he is not a medic but a mechanical 
assistant on the site with the [Demining group]. I was extremely upset that the [Demining 
group manager] had so recklessly endangered the life of one of my Inspectors in his rush to 
correct a series of completions that should have been done correctly in the first place.    
I hope that I never have to work with a person like the [Demining group manager] again, 
whose attitude to the safety of other people is definitely not in the spirit of Humanitarian Mine 
Clearance. 
Signed: QA SUPERVISOR 
The QA Inspector’s report follows. 
 
Date:  2000-11-03 
To:  Q.A Supervisor  
From:  [QA Inspector] 
1)  Today 03-11-2000 {Name 1]  told me that [Name 2] required a report from me. I was 
instructed by [Name 2] on 30-10-2000 (Monday) that together with the [Demining group 
manager] I was to go to the area of Brod to do the completion of 6 minefields, which 
minefields I together with [Name 1], had been to before to do completions but they were not in 
accordance with the UN MACC rules. 
2)  On Monday 30-10-2000 I arrived at the [Demining group] office at 6:50 where [Name 1] 
was waiting for me together with the [Demining group manager] (Deputy Program Manager). 
After a consultation between [Name 1] and the [Demining group manager], they, the 
[Demining group manager] and [Name 3] (the [Demining group manager]’s son) who was the 
medic (I found out that [Name 3] is not a medic, he is a mechanic) we decided to leave for 
Brod. We left with their vehicle at the 7:15 and we arrived at Brod at 8:45. There was a local 
person with 4 horses waiting for us, and that person offered us a drink of café, so we drank a 
café and about 9:00 we left to get the horses and we prepared all our things and we left at 
9:15 at the Brod.  
3)  The trip took some time - about 2 hrs 15 or 20 min. We had some problems with the 
horses and all the way the local person was in the lead and I was behind all of them. At some 
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time the local person stopped and he showed me that in this place there had been before one 
big minefield, which [the Demining group] had cleared.  At that moment I tried to jump from 
the horse, but the horse was afraid and I fell from him. I had some injuries to my head and in 
some other places. After the [Demining group manager] and his son asked me from a 
distance am I OK and I answered them that I am OK. 
4)  The [Demining group manager] saw that we were in a minefield and in this minefield there 
had been one accident (a demining group Operations Officer lost his leg) and he told [Name 
3] not to move because we were in a minefield, and in that moment he asked his son for the 
detector. When I heard this news I stopped and I thought that is not true but I started to look 
around and I saw the mines. Then I believed that we were in a minefield area. The 
[Demining group manager] didn’t use the detector but he ordered his son to follow his steps 
and also me to follow [his son’s] steps. Also I informed the local person to come back behind 
me and to follow my steps, because we have been in the minefield area. Slowly we moved 
from the minefield area without any accident, only that fall from the horse and that I lost a 
wristwatch in the process of falling from the horse. 
5)  After that we left to the area where we were to do the completions and we started with the 
completions of the first minefield, second and the other one to the last minefield which was in 
a very bad situation. In all the minefields I fixed the Benchmark, start point and I marked area 
by the UN MACC rules. After the completions of the minefields we returned to the base at 
Prizren. We arrived in our base about 17:40 where [Name 1] was waiting for me and I 
reported to him about all that had happened in that day. 
Signed. 
 
Statements 
The following are the statements of witness accompanying the MACC accident report, edited 
for anonymity.  
 
Statement 1 – deputy Project manager 
The deputy Project manager sent a letter to president of the demining company dated 25th 
September 2000 in which he explained the events surrounding the accident. 
The Victim was Ops Manager and was left in charge of transferring the camp to a new 
location over the weekend. Ten local deminers, three team leaders and two medics were left 
with him with two horses and their handlers. 
The weather in the mountains deteriorated over the weekend and radio communication was 
sometimes difficult due to low cloud. On Sunday 24th the deputy project manager spoke to 
the victim by radio when he requested a resupply of bread and fruit but neglected to mention 
that he was sending the ten deminers down the mountain because of the weather. The 
deminers arrived at 11 am and explained about the weather, so he sent them home for two 
days. They left the camp at 11:30 leaving him with a local assistant at the campo at the base 
of the mountain. 
A radio contact was scheduled for 12:00 but he was unable to make contact. 
At 16:00 hours (next scheduled contact) he was able to make contact although cloud was 
now covering “half of the mountain”. He was informed that the accident had occurred and that 
medics were on their way to the victim. He instructed the Team Leader in charge of the 
accident not to wait for a helicopter if the bad weather conditions made a landing unlikely, but 
to bring the victim down to the village of Brod with the horses. He would ensure that a doctor 
and am ambulance were waiting at the village. He then drove to the village of Dragas where 
he hired a local ambulance and sent it to Brod. From Dragas he could also contact KFOR and 
the [Demining group] base camp, asking them to pass the information on to relevant parties. 
By 17:20 he was in the village of Brod organising locals to assist in the evacuation down the 
mountain. 
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A KFOR helicopter arrived at 18:00 but could not see the evacuation party on the 
mountainside. Using the police blue light as a guide, the helicopter was able to leave a doctor 
on the ground. Another KFOR unit also sent an ambulance. Radio contact with the evacuation 
party was good. The evacuation party arrived in Brod at 19:00. At 19:15, the KFOR 
ambulance left for Prizren hospital with the victim. 
The deputy programme manager made arrangements for the rest of the team and followed 
with the Team Leaders who had been on the mountain with the victim, arriving at Prizen 
hospital at 22:00 hours when the victim was in surgery 
 
Statement 2 – the Victim 
On 24th of September 2000 at 08:00 the victim of the [Demining group] accident gave a 
statement to the Project Manager while in a KFOR hospital in Prizren. 
“On Sunday the 24th of September at approximately 12:20 or 12:30 hours [two named others] 
and myself were doing a recce to find a new field camp. A new HLS, and to recce a couple of 
minefields in the general area for the next weeks work. We had identified an area for a new 
campsite and we were circling that area to determine the proximity of the closest minefield. 
We pegged the four corners of it and moved out to find the new HLS and to find the next 
minefield. We came to a big rock along the trail and found traces of mines and pieces of 
PMA-1s scattered around that general area. [Name] and myself continued down the sheep 
trail and [Name] went to the left to the higher ground to try to find the AT row. 
I had located and excavated a number of PMA-1 mines on the front row of keepers: maybe 6 
or 7. I then went to continue down the row to the end to put up a marker. [Name] was 
approximately 30 meters ahead of me along the path. I heard a bang and realised that I had 
stepped on a mine. 
[The Team Leader] was at my side in a few seconds and applied pressure to my femoral 
artery and told [Name] to contact for assistance. 
I remained conscious the entire time, and I was still awake and aware of everything including 
the move down the mountain to the ambulance and the road trip. 
 
Statement 3 – Team Leader 
In a “Minefield Accident Statement” [undated] the Team Leader who was the first man to 
reach the victim stated that the group left the camp site to carry out a recce at 12:30 on the 
day of the accident [inconsistent timings]. 
They found a suitable campsite close to a small stream. As they followed the stream to look 
for a suitable spot to refill water bottles, the victim noticed the “hole for a TMA-5”. They moved 
away and “started preparing our detectors”. 
“…..Once our detectors were ready [the victim] said he would follow the holes towards the 
East and [Name] and I said we would head to the West. [Name] and I followed the holes 
checking the area until about 20m past the last hole we spotted. I suggested to [Name] that 
he head South and try to find the end of the PMR rows and I would head back and mark the 
TMA holes and he agreed. I headed along the line marking the holes with pieces of toilet 
paper on sticks and paper from my notebook. Along the way I collected whatever mine parts 
or explosives I saw and placed them in an existing pile on some high ground. I then followed 
[the victim’s] route marking the holes. When I arrived at [the Victim’s] area he informed me I 
had marked the last hole and that he had found both PMR lines and marked the first with a 
red stick. We then proceeded back to the detector bags….. we then packed up and headed in 
the direction of the second minefield. 
“We followed along a trail heading East where [the Victim] said the second one should be…. 
We followed a dry riverbed up to the next trail and followed along it until we came across a 
large rock next to the trail and [the Victim] pointed out a mine sign and then [Name] pointed 
out a second one further along the trail. We then assembled our detectors…. [The Victim] and 
I said we would check the trail where some mines were laying off to the side. When [the 
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Victim] and I arrived at the mine sign I said I would go forward and check the trail as far as the 
next sign and see if I could find the end, he said he would look for any more mines along the 
edge. I proceeded ahead until I cam across a PMR next to the trail. I then removed the fuse 
and detonator placing them in a PMA-1 that was next to it with some dirt and laid everything 
on the trail so [the Victim] could see it as he came along. When I turned around to continue 
the sweep I heard a loud explosion and ducked. I looked around and saw [the Victim] rolling 
towards the trail. I dropped the detector and ran to [the Victim] who was about 30 meters 
behind me.  
When I arrived he was lying half on the trail and half down the hill. I asked him if he was all 
right and did not notice anything wrong until I looked towards his foot. He responded by 
cursing and saying something about he didn’t see it coming. I applied pressure to his leg and 
shouted to [Name] for help. I asked [the Victim] what had happened and he replied he did not 
know. I noticed [Name] on the hill talking to someone on the radio and reassured [the Victim] 
that help was on the way. As [Name] approached us I asked him to sweep the area around us 
in case we were in a dangerous area. When he had finished I asked him to relieve me 
keeping pressure on Clinton’s leg. When we switched I told [the Victim] I was going to meet 
the medics and he told me to take his radio in his pocket. I then ran to the top of the hill to call 
the medics. I made contact with the medics and guided them to our location. I kept the horses 
by the big rock and told the medics to stay on the trail. I remained there keeping in radio 
contact with [Name] at the base camp. When the medics brought [the Victim] to the horses I 
returned to the minefield to gather the detectors. I then followed the horses back to camp and 
waited there for further instructions.” 
 
Statement 4 – Assistant Team Leader 
A statement dated 24th September 2000 and signed by the Assistant Team Leader was on 
file. The English was poor and has been corrected where the meaning was obvious in the 
following. Information duplicating that in other statements has been omitted. 
The witness stated that the group left the camp at approximately 12:30 to look for a new camp 
site, a “chopper landing zone and to see if we could locate the minefields that would be 
worked on Monday 25th September”. 
At the second minefield site, the witness separated from the Victim and went to find the top 
edge of the minefield. “While I was walking on the top path I spotted a TMA-5 lying on the 
grass with a PMA-1 next to it. I then left the path to investigate the TMA-5 hole. I found that 
the PMA-1 fuse was already taken out. I then told [the Victim] that I had found the TMA-5 
row.” 
“Then I heard a large explosion. When I looked up I saw [the Victim] rolling downhill…. I then 
jumped up and ran to where we had left our detector bags. I then contacted [Name] our medic 
who was still at the camp and asked for assistance….. 
…..at about 16:05 [the Medics] arrived on the site to work on [the Victim]. Then we loaded him 
onto a stretcher and walked him out of the minefield. We loaded him on horseback and 
started walking in the direction of Brod. When we got to the ambulance at Brod it was about 
19:10. 
 
Witness 5 – paramedic 
A statement signed and dated by a paramedic on 25th September 2000. 
“At approximately 15:45 that day our horses returned from Brod from a logistic run…. [As] we 
were waiting for the horses to get closer we heard a detonation from the hills behind us. It 
sounded close and I immediately put on my boots and started to get ready to go investigate 
closer to the sound. About 30-sec to one minute later I heard [Name] on the radio calling for 
me. We could not reply [because] he was too far obstructed by the hill but by the sound of his 
voice we knew that someone was injured. The horses were unloaded and my stretcher and 
medical bag was loaded on and myself [Name] and two locals went off in the direction of the 
blast along the track on the side of the hill. 
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On the way [Name] told me [the Victim] hit a mine. I relayed that to [Name] back at camp to 
get the necessary procedure going for help while we got to him and stabilised him. At about 
16:00-16:05 we arrived at the site of the accident. [The Victim] had a serious wound to the 
lower leg with protruding bone fragments and the foot was amputated with the exception of 
the big toe. There was significant bleeding but [Name] was applying femoral pressure most of 
the time. 
[Name] covered the wounds with field dressings and I set up an IV transfusion of Ringers 
Lactate on his left arm. He was complaining of severe pain on the leg. I set up another 
transfusion in the right arm to give IV pain medication. I gave him 100 mg Tramal at around 
16:30. We continued to stabilise the leg and applied two long splints and elevated the leg. 
The pain was not relieved very well but I was afraid of overdosing and causing sedation. Due 
to the mist the chopper would not be able to land and decision was made to travel by horse to 
Brod. [Name] radioed that [Name] would be waiting in Brod. I requested that he get a medical 
team to meet us in Brod and this was confirmed. We then loaded [the Victim] on a horse and 
started to move towards our campsite as the road to Brod led past our site. On arrival we got 
more medical supplies and I gave another Tramal 100mg IVI at around 17:35. I also tried to 
get the IVs to run but only got one patient line. Total fluid replacement to then was Haemacel 
300 mg (Colloid) and 2.5 L Ringers Lactate. Pain relief was minimal. We also confirmed that 
the helicopter was not able to land in mist and try to land in Brod. Blood pressure was 100 
mmHg systolic and pulse 85. 
We moved slowly down the mountain talking to him. He remained conscious and in pain all 
the way down. At one stage the chopper tried to approach but mist was too thick to get a 
landing zone. We continued by horse down the mountain. I walked ahead to try to determine 
the distance as the visibility was about 50m all the way…. I was about 15 minutes ahead…the 
other medic and [Name] stayed with the horses the whole way. I [reported] the Victim’s 
condition and treatment given to the German doctor waiting by the ambulance. I handed over 
the patient to the doctor completely at 19:15. [The Victim] was conscious and in pain, and 
very cold. The two space blankets he had on were not enough as it was very cold and 
exposed. The IV he had was no longer patent in the right arm.” 
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